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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaint: i f ! / Appo I lee,

Case No, 9 3 074 6-CA

v.
MICHAEL SQUIRE,

Priority No. 2

De fendant / Appe11ant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Michael Squire appeals from his convict ion I or
distributic
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i.

,i. (Supp. 1993 -, -i v

-

This Court :o^ jurisdiction pursuant
3 (2 j v -

•

^ degree felony.
t Ann, u

•

H 2a-

)•

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
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ing =md therefore cannot
State v. Dunn, 850 I-.*d

1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("a party cannot take advantage of an
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error").
2.

Did the trial court properly refuse to give defendant's

proposed entrapment instructions even though the court accurately
instructed the jury on the elements of entrapment?

A trial

court's decision not to give a requested jury instruction
presents a question of law reviewed for correctness; however, the
trial court has discretion to select between accurate, but
different instructions.

State v. Gallecros, 849 P.2d 586, 588

(Utah App. 1993) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with distribution of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1993) (R. 1). At the conclusion of a
one-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of the crime
charged (R. 89, Tr. June 23, 19931 at 317-19) . The trial court
sentenced defendant to the statutory prison term of 0-5 years,
ordered defendant to pay a $5,000 fine, and ordered defendant to
pay restitution of $50 (R. 111-12).

The trial court suspended

execution of the sentence and placed defendant on 24 months
1

The trial transcript was not separately numbered for the
appellate record. All further references to the trial transcript
will be identified as ffTr.,f
2

probation, requiring defendant to comply with certain terms and
conditions of probation (R. 112). Defendant timely filed his
notice of appeal on November 24, 1993 (R. 116).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In January 1992, Brian Barson moved to Sanpete County to
attend school and to begin undercover narcotics work (Tr. 90-91,
121).

The local narcotics officer, John Cox, instructed Mr.

Barson to develop sources for drug buys, but did not identify any
particular suspects, including defendant, for Mr. Barson to
pursue (Tr. 93-94, 134-35, 171).
Sometime after Mr. Barson began his work, he attended a
party where he participated in a conversation about drugs (Tr.
97-98).

Defendant eventually joined the conversation and

volunteered to procure marijuana for Mr. Barson (Tr. 97-98, 141).
Defendant indicated that he thought he could procure a quarter of
an ounce for approximately $50 (Tr. 99-100).

Mr. Barson accepted

defendant's invitation and agreed to meet defendant at a third
person's home on April 18, 1992 to give defendant the money for
the marijuana and to arrange a time when defendant would turn it
over to Mr. Barson (Tr. 98-104, 107-109).
After obtaining the money from Mr. Barson on April 18th,
defendant went to Salt Lake City on the 19th to procure the
marijuana (Tr. 282). When defendant returned that evening, he
met Mr. Barson and gave Mr. Barson the marijuana (Tr. 109, 11214).

Mr. Barson wore "wires" to both the April 18th and 19th

meetings, and Officer Cox monitored and recorded both
3

conversations (Tr. 103-104, 110, 174). The tape recordings were
played for the jury (Tr. 182-88, 188-92).
During the conversation on April 19th when defendant
delivered the marijuana to Mr. Barson, defendant boasted to Mr.
Barson about the quality of the marijuana, stated that he got a
good deal for $50, asked Mr. Barson to give him a "bowl" out of
the marijuana for getting it, joked with Mr. Barson about not
smoking it without him, said he needed to get more, and said that
he could get more at any time (Tr. 189-192).

On cross-

examination, defendant described his statement that "[t]his is
good F'in Bud" as a "sales pitch" (Tr. 286).

(Tr. 189-92 & 286

are attached as addendum B.)
Additional facts are recited in the argument sections to
which they are relevant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Cross-examination on prior conviction.

The trial court

properly allowed the State to cross-examine defendant about his
prior conviction for attempted distribution.

First, subsection 6

to § 76-2-303 only prohibits the State from introducing evidence
of prior convictions in its case in chief to show defendant's
predisposition to sell drugs; it does not preclude the use of
that evidence to address issues raised by defendant.

Second,

even if the trial court did err by admitting the evidence,
defendant led the court into that error and therefore cannot rely
on it as a basis for reversal.

Finally, this court may affirm

the trial court's decision on the alternative basis that the
4

evidence of defendant's prior conviction was admissible to attack
his credibility.
2.

Jury instructions.

The trial court properly instructed

the jury on defendant's entrapment defense; therefore, the trial
court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instructions does
not constitute an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.
Alternatively, even if it would have been appropriate for the
trial court to include in its instructions language requiring the
jury to consider whether defendant sold Mr. Barson drugs as a
result of defendant's own initiative or desire, the failure to do
so did not affect the outcome in this case.

The evidence

precluded any reasonable likelihood that the jury would have
believed that Mr. Barson's conduct induced defendant to sell him
marijuana.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE STATE TO CROSSEXAMINE DEFENDANT ABOUT HIS PRIOR CONVICTION FOR
ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
BECAUSE DEFENDANT REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT HE WAS NOT A
DRUG DEALER AND THAT HE NO LONGER USED MARIJUANA
Defendant supported his defense in part by offering evidence
of his good character.

Through his own testimony, the testimony

of his witnesses, and his counsel's statements to the jury,
defendant repeatedly asserted that he no longer used marijuana
and denied that he had been a drug dealer or had ever sold drugs
prior to this transaction (Tr. 80, 85-87, 230, 233-35, 252-53,
261-62, 269).
5

In support of his claim that he no longer used marijuana,
defendant volunteered that he had frequent urine drug screens
that always came back negative (Tr. 261). When the prosecutor
began to question defendant about why he was having the drug
screens, defendant's counsel asked to discuss the line of
questioning outside the jury's presence (Tr. 269-70).
Defendant's counsel then objected to allowing the State to crossexamine defendant about his previous guilty plea to a charge of
attempted distribution -- the drug screens were a condition of
probation for the prior conviction -- arguing that subsection 6
of § 76-2-303 precluded admission of that evidence.2

The State

responded that it was entitled to introduce the evidence because
defendant had opened the door by testifying about the urine drug
screens, and because it was admissible under State v. Hansen, 588
P.2d 164 (Utah 1978) to rebut defendant's entrapment evidence.
The trial court allowed the State to question defendant about the
prior offense, relying on both bases argued by the State.

(Tr.

270-77.) (Transcript pages 270-77 are attached as addendum C.)

2

Subsection 6 reads as follows:
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury
where the defense of entrapment is an issue,
past offenses of the defendant shall not be
admitted except that in a trial where the
defendant testifies he may be asked of his
past convictions for felonies and any
testimony given by the defendant at a hearing
on entrapment may be used to impeach his
testimony at trial.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(6) (1990).
6

A.

The trial court properly allowed the State to crossexamine defendant about his prior conviction for
attempted distribution of a controlled substance to
rebut evidence defendant introduced in support of his
entrapment defense.

In Utah, "[ejntrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer
or a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer
induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence
of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1990).
This definition requires applying an objective standard in
determining the validity of an entrapment defense.
Tavlor, 599 P.2d 496, 499-503 (Utah 1979).

State v.

The defendant's

predisposition to commit the crime, a relevant consideration
under the rejected subjective standard, has no relevance to this
inquiry; therefore, subsection 6 precludes the use of prior
offenses to avoid consideration of a defendant's predisposition.
Id. at 503.
However, subsection 6 does not raise an absolute bar to
introducing evidence of prior convictions.

In State v. Hansen,

588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction because the State introduced evidence of
his other wrongs in its case in chief.

Id. at 166-67. However,

the court went on to state that once defendant had introduced the
issue of entrapment, subsection 6 did not preclude the State from
introducing any evidence necessary to address that issue.
Although Hansen preceded Taylor and presumed a subjective inquiry
7

in considering an entrapment defense, the fundamental reasoning
of Hansen still controls: once a defendant introduces an issue
into the trial, subsection 6 does not operate to preclude the
State from introducing evidence of prior convictions to address
it.
In this case, subsection 6 precluded the State from using
defendant's prior conviction for attempted distribution in its
case in chief to establish his predisposition to sell drugs.
However, once defendant introduced the issues of his urine drug
screens and his prior drug sales, he could not cry foul when the
State sought to explain and rebut his evidence, and subsection 6
does not require a different result.

See also State v. Green,

578 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1978) (if a defendant "offers himself as
a witness, he then becomes subject to being treated the same as
any other witness," which includes being cross-examined on
anything that "would tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt
upon the credibility of his testimony").

Therefore, the trial

court properly allowed the State to cross-examine defendant about
his prior conviction.
Moreover, even if this court finds that the trial court
erroneously permitted the cross-examination, defendant invited
that error and therefore cannot rely on it as a basis for
reversal.

Although § 76-2-303 would normally preclude inquiry

into defendant's predisposition to sell drugs, defendant, not the
State, introduced the issue of his predisposition to sell drugs.
By supporting his entrapment defense with testimony that he no
8

longer used marijuana and that he was not and never had been a
drug dealer, defendant invoked the subjective entrapment standard
by asserting, in effect, that he had no predisposition to sell
the marijuana he sold to Mr. Barson.

He only sought the

protection of the objective test for entrapment when it would
have prevented the State from rebutting his predisposition
evidence.

Section 76-2-303 directs the fact finder's attention

away from a defendant's predisposition to commit the crime
However, where a defendant introduces evidence of his lack of
predisposition, § 76-2-303 does not preclude the State from
rebutting that evidence.

Because defendant created any error in

the first place, he cannot rely on it as a basis for reversal.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("a party cannot
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led
the trial court into committing that error"); State v. Barney,
681 P.2d 1230, 1231 n.3 (Utah 1984) (the defendant cannot
complain about evidence of his prior bad acts elicited by his own
counsel's cross-examination of the State's witness) (citing State
v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978)).
B.

Alternatively, the trial court properly permitted the
State to cross-examine defendant about his prior
conviction in order to attack his credibility.

Finally, an alternative basis exists for upholding the trial
court's decision on this issue: the trial court properly allowed
the State to cross-examine defendant about his prior conviction

9

to attack his credibility.3
App. 1991).

State v. Reed, 820 P. 2d 479 (Utah

At the same time defendant presented evidence of his

good character to support his entrapment defense, he attacked the
character of the State's witnesses.

Defendant claimed that Mr.

Barson frequently used marijuana and drank heavily at the parties
they attended (Tr. 220-21, 225, 227-28, 243-46), and that both
Officer Cox and Mr. Barson singled him out for investigation
because they had individual, personal grudges against him (Tr.
80-82, 83-85, 206-13, 258-61, 262-64).
In addition to his character evidence, defendant supported
his entrapment defense by claiming that Mr. Barson repeatedly and
incessantly requested that he acquire drugs for him and even
asked defendant's friends to prevail upon defendant to do so (Tr.
85-87, 221-30, 233-35, 241-49, 252-53, 261, 265-68).

Defendant

specifically denied ever offering to sell marijuana to Mr. Barson
(Tr. 266-68).

The State's evidence contradicted defendant's.

Mr. Barson testified that defendant solicited the sale, not the
other way around (Tr. 97-98, 141). Both Mr. Barson and Officer
Cox denied that they held grudges against defendant or that they
had singled him out for investigation (Tr. 93-94, 126-32, 133-35,
141, 170-71, 202).
In State v. Reed, as in this case, the defendant's evidence
directly contradicted the State's, the defendant attacked the
3

Although the trial court did not rely on this basis for
admitting the testimony, this court "may affirm the trial court's
decision to admit evidence on any proper grounds, even though the
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling."
State v.
Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted).
10

character of the State's witness while presenting his character
in a favorable light, and the defendant denied using drugs.

Id.

at 481. On appeal, this court upheld the trial court's decision
to introduce testimony that police found drug paraphernalia in
the defendant's apartment because it impeached defendant's
credibility.

IdL at 482.4

Similarly, defendant in this case offered evidence of his
good character to support his defense, repeatedly asserting both
that he did not use marijuana and that he had never been a drug
dealer.

Having done so, he cannot complain because the trial

court allowed the State to cross-examine him about his prior
conviction for attempted distribution in order to rebut the
credibility of his character evidence.

Id. at 481-82.

See also

State v. Green, 578 P.2d at 513-14 (in a prosecution on two
charges of selling narcotics, testimony about defendant selling
drugs on occasions other than those charged was properly
admissible where defendant claimed he was not a drug dealer).
Additionally, defendant's evidence directly contradicted the
State's.

Therefore, credibility became a crucial issue, and the

State was entitled to introduce evidence suggesting that
defendant had lied about his prior dealings in drugs in order to

4

This court also rejected the defendant's claim that the
trial court should have excluded the evidence under rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, holding that "[i]t would be a mockery of our
justice system to allow a defendant to take the stand and testify
as to his own good character while impugning the character of an
opposing witness, and then claim that his testimony is not subject
to cross-examination because such inquiry would be too
prejudicial." Id.
11

attack his credibility generally.

State v. Reed, 820 P.2d at

481-82.
The record clearly establishes that the State used
defendant's conviction for no other purpose than to attack the
credibility of his statement that he was not a drug dealer.
After cross-examining defendant about his prior conviction, the
State made only one other reference to it.

In his closing

argument, the prosecutor made the following comment:
"[Defendant] says he's not a drug dealer.

He has a conviction, a

drug conviction, besides the one we're here dealing on today"
(Tr. 301). Subsection 6 of § 76-2-303 does not preclude crossexamining defendant about his prior convictions in order to
attack his credibility.

The subsection's purpose is to preclude

offering evidence of predisposition.

State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d

at 503. Allowing evidence of prior convictions to attack
credibility does not thwart that purpose, and the State used
defendant's prior conviction only to attack his credibility.
For all of the reasons stated above, the trial court
properly permitted the State to cross-examine defendant about his
prior conviction.

In any event, even if the trial court erred,

defendant created the error and therefore cannot rely on it as a
basis for reversal.

12

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRAPMENT INSTRUCTION PROPERLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE;
THEREFORE, THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS.
A trial court's decision not to give a requested jury
instruction presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
State v. Galleaos, 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993).

However,

the trial court has discretion to select between accurate, but
different instructions.

Id.

Defendant has not shown that the

trial court committed reversible error by rejecting his proposed
instructions.
A.

Defendant has preserved his appellate claim only as to
his proposed instruction nos. 4 and 7.

At the outset, it is necessary to define the scope of the
claim defendant has preserved for appeal.5 Defendant originally
submitted ten proposed entrapment instructions.

However, when

the court and counsel discussed the instructions, defendant
specifically stated only that the trial court should give his
instruction nos. 4 and 7,6 and that he did not have any other
objections to the instructions.

Therefore, defendant waived any

challenge that the failure to give the other eight instructions
was error.

See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)

5

On appeal, defendant has not identified with specificity
which of his proposed jury instructions he claims the trial court
should have given. He only identifies the general substance of
what he believes the instructions should have included.
6

It is not clear whether defendant wanted these instructions
given in addition to or instead of the trial court's entrapment
instruction.
13

(where counsel read and affirmatively represented that she had no
objection to a proposed jury instruction, defendant had
affirmatively waived any challenge to that instruction, even
under a manifest injustice analysis).
B*

The trial court's entrapment instruction accurately
defined the defense for the jury.

The trial court's entrapment instruction repeated the
statutory definition of that defense (R. 67) .7 Therefore, the
trial court accurately instructed the jury on defendant's theory
of the case.

State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 748-49 (Utah 1984)

("[t]his Court has approved giving the statutory definition of
entrapment to the jury") (dicta, citation omitted).
Because the trial court accurately instructed the jury, it
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give defendant's
requested instructions.8
7

State v. Gallecros. 849 P.2d 586, 590

The court's instruction reads as follows:

You are hereby instructed that it is a defense that
the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or
person directed by or acting in cooperation with the
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit
it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
The defense is available even though the actor
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute
the offense
(R. 67).
Defendant's proposed instruction no. 4 reads as follows:
If you find that there is reasonable doubt as to
whether the offense committed was the product of Michael
14

(Utah App. 1993) ("Our inquiry therefore must center on the jury
instruction actually used and determine whether it accurately
states the law.

So long as the jury instruction used was

accurate, it was not error for the trial court to refuse a
different instruction that was also accurate.").

This court need

not even consider whether defendant's proposed instructions were
accurate or even preferable to the one given.

State v. Pedersen,

802 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d
241 (Utah 1991).

Therefore, defendant has not and cannot

establish that the refusal to give his proposed instructions
constituted an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.9
C.

The trial court's refusal to include in its
instructions what defendant claims on appeal it should
have did not affect the outcome.

Squire's initiative and desire then you must find Michael
Squire not guilty of the offense of distribution of a
controlled substance
(R. 27). His proposed instruction no. 7 reads as follows:
In evaluation [sic] the course of conduct between
the government representative and Michael Squire, the
transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction
between the agent and Michael Squire, and the respoonse
[sic] to the inducements or persuasion of the police
agent are all to be considered in judging what the effect
of the governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal
person
(R. 30).
9

Although the State maintains that defendant has only
preserved this claim with respect to his proposed instructions 4
and 7, the State's argument on the merits would dispose of any
claim based on the failure to give any of defendant's other eight
proposed instructions.
That is, the trial court accurately
instructed the jury on defendant's entrapment defense; therefore,
it did not err by not giving any of defendant's proposed
instructions.
15

On appeal, defendant claims that the "jury should have been
instructed upon the issue of reasonable doubt as to whether the
crime committed was a product of the defendant's own initiative
and desire or the persistent efforts of the police authority to
induce him or create a substantial risk that he would commit the
crime with which the state would charge him."
at 13 (emphasis added).

Appellant's Brief

Even if these consideration would have

been appropriate, the failure to include them does not undermine
confidence in the outcome.
reversal.

Therefore, it does not warrant

Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (1994) ("Any error, defect,

irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded"); State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987) (an error does not warrant reversal
unless it undermines the reviewing court's confidence in the
outcome).
At trial, the State played a tape of the conversation when
defendant gave Mr. Barson the marijuana.

See addendum B.

During

that conversation, defendant boasted about the quality of the
marijuana and the low price for which he obtained it, asked Mr.
Barson to give him some of the marijuana, and told Mr. Barson
that he could get more (Tr. 189-92).

On cross-examination, the

prosecutor asked defendant what he meant when he said that the
marijuana was "good F'in Bud" (Tr. 286). Defendant responded
that this statement was a "sales pitch" (Tr. 286). These
unchallenged statements from defendant rebutted any inference
that defendant went through with the sale only as a result of Mr.
16

Barson's alleged pestering: typically, only a sales person uses
sales pitches.

The refusal to include instructions that would

have required the jury to consider whether the sale resulted from
defendant's own initiative and desire does not affect the outcome
of the case because the jury would not likely have concluded
otherwise.

Therefore, it does not require reversal.

Based on the above, the trial court's entrapment instruction
does not constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Zo1^

day of July, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

^ X ^ U A ^ $'

U-<^^

THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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an oral prescription, that is not obtained within ten days of the date
the prescription was written or authorized, may not be filled or dispensed,
(g) An order for a controlled substance in Schedules II through V for
use by an inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from
all requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is:
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient and designates
the quantity ordered;
(ii) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by
the prescriber affirming his authorization of the order within 48
hours after filling or administering the order, and the patient's record
reflects the quantity actually administered; and
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession
within the physical structure of the hospital, or the order is taken
from a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount
taken from the supply is administered directly to the patient authorized to receive it,
(8) No information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an attempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled
substance is considered to be a privileged communication.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, S 6; 1972, ch. 21,
i 1; 1977, ch. 29, 5 5; 1979, ch. 12,I 4; 1980,
ch. 6, i 39; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, t 96; 1985,
ch. 187, i 81; 1986, ch. 23, t 4; 1986, ch. 194,
f 13; 1987, ch. 92, f 99; 1987, ch. 161, fi 202;
1989, ch. 225, t 61; 1989, ch. 253, ( 2; 1991,
ch. 198, j 3; 1993, ch. 39, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - T h e 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, rewrote Subsec-

tions (l)(a) and (2), rewrote the introductory
paragraph of Subsection (3)(a), rewrote Subsection (3)(b), rewrote the introductory paragraph
0 f Subsection (4)(a), and rewrote Subsection
(5)(a)
fTht 1 9 9 3 amendment, effective May 3,1993,
inserted "denied" and made punctuation
^
m S u b s e c t i o n (4)(a)(iv).

58-37*8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business a*
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect ttf
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent,
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of
pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person is
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect
to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through
(2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not
authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized
by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree
felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
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(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist,
veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or
obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to
disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source,
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or
address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any application, report, or other document required to be kept by this chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful
under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act,
or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
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(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to V2 the maximum sentence imposed by
law for the offense committed.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term •*
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no even
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later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the
evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b).
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
*&y person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
•Hall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
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History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 5 8; 1972, ch. 22,
* 1; 1977, ch. 29, * 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985,
ch. 146, $ 1; 1986, ch. 196, 5 1; 1987, ch. 92,
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 95, ft 1;
1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch. 56, ft 1; 1989, ch.
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1;
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990,
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198,
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, $ 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch. 161, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "to obtain a prescription for" and "or
failure by the person to disclose his receiving
any controlled substance from another source"
in Subsection (4XaXii) and corrected two reference errors in Subsection (13).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, ft 2, effective from April 23, 1990 until July 1, 1990,
corrected reference errors in Subsections (9)(a)
and (13Kb).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, J 3, effective July 1,1990, substituted "Section 77-18-1"
for "Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" in Subsection (9)(a).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 80, effective
April 29, 1991, in Subsection (5)(a), inserted
Subsection (ii), redesignated former Subsection
(ii) as (iii), substituted "or institution under

Subsections (5)(aHi) and (ii)" for wUrui
section (5)(a)(ir in Subsection (iij)t ?JJ
Subsections (iv) through (vih), redesi
former Subsections (iii) and (iv) as (ix) JJM
and substituted "Subsections (5)(aXi) thi*
(vhT for "Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii)" in Sub
tion (ix); substituted "Chapter 37a, TitU
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act or Chapter '
Title 58, Imitation Controlled Substances i
for "Chapters 37a or 37b, Title 58" in Subj
tion (13Xa); and added Subsection (14) (ap^
ing as Subsection (13) after January 1, X9<
The 1991 amendment by ch. 198, effect
April 29, 1991, substituted all of the pre*
language after "Schedules II through V*
Subsection UXaXiii) for "under an order or p
scription," and made stylistic changes in \
introductory paragraph of Subsection (5x t
The 1991 amendment by ch. 268, effects
January 1, 1992, deleted former Subsecti
(13), imposing a fee of $150 against each p<
son convicted of, and each juvenile fom
within the court's jurisdiction because of, coi
mitting an offense and providing for the use
funds generated by the fee.
This section is set out as reconciled by tr
Office of Legislative Research and Genen
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
1,000 feet of a public school are governed b]
the statute and susceptible to its enhancet
penalties. Stat* v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utal
1989).
The penalty enhancement provision of Subsection (5)(a)(iii) is not unconstitutional, since
the distinction between simple possession of
controlled substances and possession in proximity to a school is a valid one, reasonably related to the legislative purpose of creating a
drug-free environment around schoolchildren.
State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Admissibility of evidence.
Arranging sale.
Distribution.
—Distribution for value.
Evidence.
Possession.
—Amount.
Search and seizure.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
In accord with bound volume. See State v.
Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Subsection (5) does not violate a defendant's
due process rights by imposing an enhanced
penalty for violations that take place within
1,000 feet of a school. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d
497 (Utah 1989).
Subsection (5Kd), which eliminates lack of
knowledge about the aggravating factor's presence as a defense for the enhanced penalty,
does not violate due process. State v. Moore,
782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Subsection (5) does not violate equal protection on the ground that it treats drug dealers
in small towns differently from those in large
cities, since all defendants state-wide who distribute a controlied substance for value within

Admissibility of evidence.
Evidence of defendant's possession of marijuana, similarly packaged, twelve days prior to
the offense charged, was properly admitted,
where the contested evidence was particularly
probative on the issue of constructive possession and was illustrative of defendant's common plan of marijuana distribution. State v.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Arranging tale.
The offense of arranging the distribution for
value of a controlled substance does not require
the actual distribution. All that is needed is
the arrangement for such distribution, coupled
with knowledge or intent. Evidence of an actual sale may be helpful, or even necessary, in
proving knowledge or intent, but sale itself is
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jury asserted defense of coercion where defendant admitted his escape but claimed he did so
because of trouble with the prison inmates
caused by his failure to pay for broken radio.
State v. Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353,393 P.2d 390
(1964).
To avail himself of the defense of compulsion
due to threats of violence, a defendant in a trial
for escape must present evidence that he was
compelled to escape by threat of imminent violence which he could not have reasonably resisted; for a threat to be imminent, it would
have to appear that it had been communicated
to the defendant that he would be subjected to
physical force presently. State v. Harding, 635
P.2d 33 (Utah 1981).
In the context of escape, the threat or use of
unlawful physical force alleged in support of a
compulsion defense must be at least that which
would cause substantial bodily injury. State v.
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).
-—Instructions.
Trial court's instruction requiring that the
threat of substantial bodily injury be specific
was proper at defendant's trial for escape.
State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).
Trial court properly instructed the jury that

the duress defense was not available in response to an escape charge unless there was no
time for complaint to the authorities or a history of futile complaints. State v. Tuttle, 730
P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).
Trial court properly instructed the jury that
duress would not be a defense to an escape
charge unless the defendant reported to the authorities immediately after the escape. State v.
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).
Standard.
Where record was replete with evidence that
would sustain, if not compel, a finding that defendant was not coerced or threatened with immediate use of unlawful physical force when he
aided and abetted in rape, there was no need to
determine whether to use a subjective or objective standard as to defendant's perception of
coercion or threat of force. State v. Alexander,
597 P.2d 890 (Utah 1979).
Defendant's claim of compulsion in prosecution for theft was rejected because the defendant failed to demonstrate specific imminent
threats and that there were no reasonable legal alternatives to committing the crime. State
v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 148.
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 49.
A.L.R. — Coercion, compulsion, or duress as
defense to charge of kidnapping, 69 A.L.R.4th
1005.

Construction and application of statutes justifying the use of force to prevent the use of
force against another, 71 A.L.R.4th 940.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 38.

76-2-303. Entrapment
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threatening bodily iiyury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening the iryury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made
at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit
a later filing.
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(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be
appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-303, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-303.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Consent to police visits.
Evidence of past offenses.
Hearsay.
Jury question.
Nature of defense.
Objective standard.
Offense involving threat of injury.
Officer's knowledge of defendant's identity.
Providing opportunity to commit offense.
Specific police conduct.
—Persistent requests by officer.
—Use of attractive female undercover officer.
—Use of close friendship.
Consent to police visits.
Defendant was not entrapped for unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance
where, although the police officer visited the
defendant's office on several occasions, the
visits were with defendant's invitation or consent. State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah
1986).
Evidence of past offenses.
State is not permitted during its case in chief
at trial to introduce into evidence past offenses
committed by defendant where entrapment is
an issue; however, state must be allowed to
present any evidence in impeachment or rebuttal that would show defendant's disposition to
commit the crime charged; the fact that this
may include prior acts of crime or misconduct
would not render such evidence inadmissible.
State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978).
Where defendant charged with attempted
Jneft by receiving stolen property raised defense of entrapment, it was reversible error to
permit undercover police officer to testify on
direct examination in state's case in chief as to
Betters relating to defendant's previous transections relating to stolen property. State v.
Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978).

Hearsay.
Excluded testimony offered, not to prove the
truth of what informant said to defendants, but
rather to show that informant made statements that induced defendants to commit the
offense should not have been excluded as hearsay since truth of statements was irrelevant,
the crucial factor being whether statements
were made and whether they influenced the
defendants' behavior. State v. Salmon, 612
P.2d 366 (Utah 1980).
Jury question.
Where private citizen warned authorities
that defendants were coming from California
to Utah for purpose of robbing some Utah
drugstores and thereafter drove the defendants
around to various drugstores at their request
and where government's conduct was limited
to placing a listening device on the informant
and tailing defendants until they carried out
their preconceived intentions, entrapment was
a factual question properly presented to the
jury. State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366 (Utah
1980).
The question of entrapment was properly left
to the jury, where an undercover police officer,
who had reason to believe that defendant was
involved in drug trafficking, asked defendant
to sell him cocaine on four occasions over a
forty-day period and, on the fourth contact, defendant agreed to sell him cocaine, made arrangements to pick it up, and sold him a gram.
State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986).
Nature of defense.
Though it is sometimes said that entrapment
is an affirmative defense, it is properly regarded as a factor tending to raise a reasonable
doubt that defendant freely and voluntarily
committed the offense charged; in determining
the validity of an entrapment defense, the
court must therefore consider (1) whether it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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JUDICIAL CODE

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other iocal agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
idges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
»view and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
iginal appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
hapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

6

78-3-4

DISTRICT COURTS
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, * 46; 19S7, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, S 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12.

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (2Kb) and redesignated former Subsections (2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i)
through (k).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
viction or sentence is challenged. Padiila v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah
1991).

ANALYSIS

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Scope.
Cited.

Scope.
This statute does not authorize the Court of
Appeals to review the orders of every administrative agency, but allows judicial review of
agency decisions "when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v.
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 542
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus
petition, in which defendant claimed only that
his due process rights were violated at a hearing before the parole board, lay to the Court of
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals
of first degree or capital felony convictions and
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-

Cited in State v. Humphrey, 176 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8 (1991).

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-4.

78-3-11.5.

Section
78-3-16.5.
78-3-21.

Jurisdiction — Transfer of
cases to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction when
circuit and district court
merged.
State District Court Administrative System.

78-3-21.5.

Repealed.
Judicial Council — Creation —
Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
Data bases for judicial boards.

78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court —
Appeals — Jurisdiction when circuit and district
court merged.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of
the district court in multiple judge districts or the district court judge in
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upon the
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced
7
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association or relation to attorney in case, 65
A.L.R.4th 73.
Disqualification from criminal proceeding of
trial judge who earlier presided over disposition of case of coparticipant, 72 A.L.R.4th 651.

Rule 30

Power of state trial court in criminal case to
change venue on its own motion, 74 A.L.R.4th
1023.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 115 to
145.

Rule 29A. Change of judge as a matter of right.
(a) Notice of change. In any criminal action commenced after April 15,
1992 in any district, circuit or justice court, all parties joined in the action
may, by unanimous agreement and without cause, change the judge assigned
to the action by filing a notice of change of judge. The parties shall send a copy
of the notice to the assigned judge and the presiding judge. The notice shall be
signed by all parties and shall state: (1) the name of the assigned judge; (2) the
date on which the action was commenced; (3) that all parties joined in the
action have agreed to the change; (4) that no other persons are expected to be
named as parties; and (5) that a good faith effort has been made to serve all
parties named in the pleadings. The notice shall not specify any reason for the
change of judge. Under no circumstances shall more than one change of judge
be allowed under this rule in any action. A change of judge under this rule is
available only after a judge has been assigned to the case for trial. A notice of
change may not be filed prior to or during a preliminary examination.
(b) Time. The notice shall be filed no later than 7 days after notice of
assignment or reassignment of judge. Failure to file a timely notice precludes
any change of judge under this rule.
(c) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a notice of change, the assigned judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge shall
promptly determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the
action. If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall
promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether
the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action.
(d) Nondisclosure to court No party shall communicate to the court, or
cause another to communicate to the court, the fact of any party's seeking
consent to a notice of change.
(e) Rule 29 unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights under Rule 29.
(Added effective April 15, 1992; amended effective May 1, 1993.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, in Subdivision (b)
substituted the first sentence for "In misdemeanor cases, the notice shall be filed no later
than 7 days after arraignment. In felony cases,
the notice shall be filed no later than 7 days
after arraignment or notice of assignment of
judge, whichever occurs first."

Compiler's Notes. — In a minute entry
dated January 21, 1993, the Utah Supreme
Court provided that this rule, "originally
adopted on an emergency basis effective April
15, 1992, has now been published for public
comment. The Advisory Committee proposed
amendments to paragraph (b). Those amendments are adopted, effective May 1, 1993."

Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
ubstantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
rrors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
le court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
Cross-References. — Arraignment, neces;y of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10.

Indictments and informations, harmless
errors, U.R.Cr.P. 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

mission of photographic evidence
rical mistakes.
>efendant's right of allocution.
•mless error.
lor defect.

Substantial right affected.
—State's burden of persuasion.
Variances.
Cited.
Admission of Dhotn«n»o~i-*~ -

ADDENDUM B
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Ouch!

Shit.

Fuckin' dog.

MR. SQUIRE:

Ha-ha ha.

MR. BARSON:

Bit my—[INAUBIDLE] —off.

MR. SQUIRE:

That's right.

Where's Linda?
MR. BARSON:

She's at home doin' some homework.

{INAUDIBLE]
Where do you want to go?
MR. SQUIRE:

Just up the—[INAUBIDLE].

{INAUDIBLE]
MR. SQUIRE:

Oh, you sure knew that dog.

[INAUDIBLE]
MR. BARSON:

That's cool.

[INAUDIBLE]
How much did you get?
MR. SQUIRE:

[INAUDIBLE]—under a quarter.

MR. BARSON:

Under a quarter?

[INAUDIBLE]
MR. SQUIRE:

You can smell it from here.

MR. BARSON:

Holy shit.

Yeah, it is.

It's

fuckin' good, man.
MR. SQUIRE:

It's good fuckin' Bud, dude.

MR. BARSON:

Is it?

Do you use it?

MR. SQUIRE: Huh?
MR. BARSON:

Do you use it?
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1
2

MR. S Q U I R E :

O n e bowl u/ith that, d u d e , is

w h a t — [INAUDIBLE ] —

3

MR. BARSON:

All right, m a n .

4

MR. S Q U I R E :

That look good?

5

MR. BARSON:

Looks better than that other crap w e

MR. S Q U I R E :

[INAUDIBLE]

6

got.

7
8

T h a n k s a lot.

fuckin'.

For 5 0 b u c k s , that aint

I got a good d e a l , d u d e .

9

MR. BARSON:

Y e a h , you did.

10

MR. S Q U I R E :

Turn your dome light u p .

11
12
13
14
15

Maybe—[INAUDIBLE].
MR. BARSON:
smells good.

S e e , it's all b u d s .
Holy cow!

All b u d s , huh?

That

All right.

MR. S Q U I R E :

Let m e have a bowl out of it for

goin' and gettin' it for y o u .

16

MR. BARSON:

G o ahead and take a p i n c h .

17

MR. S Q U I R E :

[ I N A U D I B L E ] — y e a h , that's a good buy,

18

MR. BARSON:

Thanks a lot, m a n .

19

MR. S Q U I R E :

Yeah.

20

MR. BARSON:

2i

MR. S Q U I R E :

A little bud?

22

MR. BARSON:

Yeah.

23

MR. S Q U I R E :

24

MR. BARSON:

Bud.

25

MR. S Q U I R E :

Fuckin' it's a good bud, d u d e .

Kind of hard t h e r e .

That's cool.

[INAUDIBLE]
All right.

We'll run you back,
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1
2

MR. BARSON:

[INAUDIBLE]—it's done.

I

s h o u l d — [ I N A U D I B L E ] — w e got s o m e —

3

MR. SQUIRE:

Don't smoke it without me.

5

MR. BARSON:

All right.

6

MR. SQUIRE:

I was just givin' you shit.

7

smoke till your heart's content.

4

Ha-ha

ha-ha ha.

Fuck,

I need to get more.

8 II

MR. BARSON:

Can you?

9

MR. SQUIRE:

Yeah.

10

MR. BARSON:

How much in a quarter—[INAUDIBLE]?

11

MR. SQUIRE:

A quarter?

12

MR. BARSON:

Yeah.

13

MR. SQUIRE:

80, but it's a lot bigger than that.

14

MR. BARSON:

80 bucks?

15

MR. SQUIRE:

Yeah.

16

MR. BARSON:

All right.

17

MR. SQUIRE:

See, t h i s — a n d I really didn't know

Any time I want to.

What's—

[INAUDIBLE]

18

that's why it cost so much when I got up there.

19

[INAUDIBLE]—bad shit from it, you know?

20

MR. BARSON:

Yeah.

21

MR. SQUIRE:

I left a few other b a g s — [ I N A U D I B L E ] .

22

MR. BARSON:

[INAUDIBLE]

23

Are you goin' next week?

24

MR. SQUIRE:

Yeah.

25

MR. BARSON:

All right.

I'd like to.
We're plannin' on it now.
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MR. SQUIRE:

Fuck, I got to go to u/ork tomorrow

and the next day.
MR. BARSON?

All right.

And you know—he's got my

number, so just give me a call.
MR. SQUIRE: Okay.
MR. BARSON:

Okay.

MR. SQUIRE:

You bet.

MR. BARSON:

6268, man.

MR. SQUIRE:

6268?

MR. BARSON:

Yeah.

MR. SQUIRE:

All right.

MR. BARSON:

See ya. Thanks.'

[INAUDIBLE, WHEREUPON MR. COX STOPPED PLAYING THE
SECOND TAPED CONVERSATION]
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED
MR. BERRY:

Your Honor, the tape wasn't finished.

THE COURT:

It wasn't finished?

MR. BERRY:

No.

And I'd like the jury to hear the

last remark on this tape, of the confidential informant, if
they're gonna hear it.
[WHEREUPON MR. COX STARTED TAPE AGAIN AS FOLLOWS. J
SECOND TAPED CONVERSATION CONTINUED
•MR. BARSON:

Shiah!"

[WHEREUPON MR. COX STOPPED THE TAPE]
MR. BLACKHAM:

We offer 2 and 3, Your Honor.
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WITNESS:

A

Umf I gave him the money back

for that.
1

2

3

Q

You gave Brian money back?

A

Yes.

Q

How much?

A

I can't remember.

Q

Okay.

I did.

Did you—what did you mean u/hen you saidf

•This is good F'in' Bud."

4

5

A

Sales pitch.

Q

Sales pitch?

A

Yeah.

Q

What do you mean a "sales pitch"?

A

It u/as because I told him that I could get it for

Q

Okay.

A

—that earlier that day.

Q

What do you mean u/hen you told him it looked

A

What?

Q

What did you mean u/hen you told Brian the stuff

him—
6

7
good.

8

looked good?
A

Well, from u/hat I knew of itf it looked like it

u/as alright.
9

Q

bou/l ?

Okay.

Did you ask him if he would let you have a

ADDENDUM C
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1

an error that may cause a mistrial.

2

MR. BLACKHAM:

3

THE COURT:

Let's discuss it.

Ladies and gentlemen I'd like you to

4

go into the Jury Room in just a moment.

But I admonish you

5

again, don't talk about this case with anyone.
(WHEREUPON JURY WENT TO THE JURY ROOM]

6

PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE THE JURY

7
8

THE COURT:

Close the door. Sheriff.

9

[BAILIFF RESPONDED AND CLOSED COURTROOM DOOR]

10

MR. BERRY:

Mr. Squires was convicted—

11

THE COURT:

For the purpose of the record, this

12

conversation is now taking place outside the presence of the

13

jury.

14

All right.

15

MR. BERRY: Mr. Squires was convicted of

16
17

Go ahead.

possession of marijuana, of a controlled substance.
MR. BLACKHAM:

That's not correct, counsel.

18

get it correct.

19

of a controlled substance.

He was convicted of attempted distribution

20

MR. BERRY:

21

(MR. BLACKHAM HANDED DOCUMENT TO Mh. BERRY]

22

THE COURT: What is that?

23

MR. BERRY:

24

Obviously, the statute says that he can't ask

25

Let's

I'll just take a look.

A Class-A?

A Class-A Misdemeanor.

about anything, other than felonies.
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MR. BLACKHAM:

1
2

Honor.

I want to address that, too, Your

But let's finish here.

3

THE COURT: Go ahead.

4

MR. BLACKHAM:

Well, obviously what he's getting

5

at here is he doesn't want me to pursue about the urinalysis

6

test that Mr. Squire volunteered.

7

it; he answered it, Your Honor, and I want to pursue the

8

urinalysis test.

9

is that's required by his Probation Officer.

He questioned him about

And obviously, why he's on urinalysis test

They brought it up, Your Honor, and I'm entitled

10
11

to pursue it. And I want the Court—in fact, I'm gonna flat

12

out ask him. Your Honor, about this conviction.

13

the Court to read.

14

(INDICATED]

15

I've got a case right on point—

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BLACKHAM:

18

Let me see the case.

to ask this question:

— o n this issue that I'm entitled
State vs. Hansen.

[HANDED DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND COURT EXAMINED

19
20

And I want

SAME]

21

MR. BERRY:

22

MR. BLACKHAM:

23

(HANDED COPY TO MR. BERRY AND MR. BERRY CONFERRED

24
25

I'd like to take a look at that, too.
Here, your copy, counsel.

WITH HIS CLIENT]
THE COURT: Do you want to look at this, counsel?
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MR. BERRY:

I have a copy of the case. Your Honor.

THE COURT:

May I see the the conviction

statement.
MR. BLACKHAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

[MR. BLACKHAM HANDED COPY OF STATEMENT TO COURT]
THE COURT

, M l right.

Have you had a chance to

look it over?
MR. BERRY

1 have read 1 tie case

THE COURT

A H right.

I l l hear you, if you want

to talk any more about i..
MR. BERRY:

I wc n il< :! II ike t A : >

:•."'.

think that there are later cases that are
directly on point, as well.

1 think that this case that M r .

Bldi.kliani has produced heie Is «in e<iif!v case, a 1978 case,
that the statute specifically prohibits Mr. Blackham from
addressing any offenses, other than felonies, and 1 .hat t; .his
case focuses on a subject ve intent of the defendant here.
Now that has been changed by our Supreme Court.

In the

early Ron & Chapman it was subjective intent of the
defendant that was important,

Btit Ihe entrapment defense,

by virtue of later decisions of our Supreme C o u r t —
THE COURT:

Well, do yon have MIII, , rounst'l?

Specifically show them, to me.
MR. BERRY:

i have several cases.

THE COURT:

Just

point

oiiiiii utici'i 1 ,

so

i clou i h a v e
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1

to sit and read all of them-

2

read.

3

MR. BERRY:

4

MR. BLACKHAM:

Point out where you want me to

The—was this case shepherdized?
Yes, Your Honor.

And I'm not

5

arguing about the subjective intent issue.

My point here is

6

what I'm allowed to bring up in the way of rebuttal to an

7

entrapment defense and Hansen says I am entitled.
I can't do it on direct, and the Supreme Court

8
9

reversed this case.

10

rebuttal, Your Honor, for rebuttal evidence, I am allowed to

11

do it to rebut entrapment, and Hansen is right on point on

12

that issue, Your Honor.
MR. BERRY:

13
14

They did it on direct.

But on

Well, I don't think he's testified to

anything that would even open the door here.
THE COURT:

15

Well, he has testified to this.

Of course, it doesn't appear to me like it makes

16
17

any difference, because you're using the defense of

18

entrapment and that alone would make it possible for him to

19

bring it in.

20

that, he's been taking these urinalysis—was it urinalysis

21

tests?

22

But in this case he's testified that besides

MR. BERRY:

He has. And he's on probation.

23

he didn't testify to the probation.

24

THE COURT: Well, I know.

25

convict me.

But

But he's saying, 'Don't

I've been taking these urinalysis tests and
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that shou/s that

clean

\sn

that t-ie purpose?

ThaL & Liie purpose I got ot it of hi s *«--rimony.
Nou/ M r . B l a c k h a m s a y s , "All r i g h t .

If tl lat shou/s y o u ' r e

clean, why are you taking the urinalysis test? 1
MR. BERRV i

Hi" a l s o t e s t i f i e d M i a l Ii**'" i ? u s n d

marijuana before and stopped using it; and he didn't testify
that he was getting urinalysis testing in a probation
agreemei it enter ed ii 11:c:> by tit le Cot 11 1: because I ne was convicted
of a crime.
THE COURT:

Well, go ahead.

MR. BLACKHAM:
THE COURT:

Anything else?

No, Your Honor.

Anything else, Mi, Berry?

Something in those cases that would show me?
• I wish you would

Have* you got. the rules of

evidence thereupon which this is based?

I'd like to see

thai rule.
MR. BLACKHAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

statute, of course, the entrapment statute.

They cite the
But they also

cite wl :ta1: is i loit • R u l e 4 0 4 ,
THE COURT:

That's what I wanted to look at

MR. BLACKHAM:

And it's under (b} that they cite

t h i s , Html this Is hi M I n fi upei

ti'UPbt ion under 4lM» Y o u r

Honor, where this is also a knowledge of intent

Where this

is a knowledge, Your Honor, where this is entrapment.
(COURT REVIEWED RULE 404]

PAGE 275
MR. BERRY:

1
2

I'm missing.

Where are you reading

there, Ross?

3

MR. BLACKHAM:

4

MR. BERRY:

5

MR. BLACKHAM:

404.

(b)?
404(b). other crimes, wrongs, or

6

acts.

And this case cites statute is supporting it.

7

ruling that the prosecution is allowed to ask questions like

8

this to rebut entrapment.
MR. BERRY:

9

Of course, that's 404(b) states that

10

they1re not admissible.

11

MR. BLACKHAM:

12

MR. BERRY:

13

MR. BLACKHAM:

14

MR. BERRY:

15
16

It's

Unless—

It doesn't say -unless".
Oh, yeah, it does, too.

It may however be admissible to other

purposes.
MR. BLACKHAM:

Yeah, such as intent, knowledge,

17

motive, and specifically what's the issue in this case is

18

his intent.

19

their decision.

20

The Hansen case cites that rule in support of

MR. BERRY:

I think that is the whole approach

21

here obviates the purpose.

22

to the jury.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BLACKHAM:

25

MR. BERRY:

I think it's highly prejudicial

All right.

Anything else?

No, Your Honor.

I'd cite the case of State of Utah
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vs. Ronalu t, Wriaht. 744 PACIFIC II f 315 Utah Appellate
Court 1987:

•Character— f

v*.

t states, and I 1 !! i>»ad ii

•Character of the suspect predis

to commit the

offense and subjective intent ~'t irrelevant ••• determine
u/hether the police entrapped the suspect
conduct creates the substantial i l^i\ p than a normal law
bidir

i u/ould be induced to commit the crime,

entrapment has occurred."
Also, State vs. Belt, 780 PACIFIC II f 1271f a
1989 Utttfi case.

The objective for the test determining

u/hether defendant has been entrapped is u/hether the police
conduct used In ohtainjny evidence of the commission of the
offense produced pursuasion."
THE COURT:
isn'L

Well, J aaree wild that, but that \

ase.
hink that's u/hat he's imnbinw

MR. BERRY
here is Mr. Squire'b

on

I jiist cited a case that says

it's i iot eves \ f ertinent in an entrapment defense.
THE COURT:

Well, do you have anvt IIJUM else? . •'•'•

MR. BLACKHAM:
MR., BERRY:

Honor.

I might have one moment.

[CHECKED NOTES]
MR. BERRY:

I t)r i U W Y that if the jury heard the

evidence ol I his prior conviction, that it would be highly
prejudicial of Mr. Squire.
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THE COURT:
hear it.

Well, I'm going to allou/ the jury to

I think you've opened the door up. Mr. Squire

opened the door with his statement.

And also, I think that

this case controls in the State vs. Hansen
588 PACIFIC II, 164, and authorize that you bring the jury
back in.
[BAILIFF RESPONDED AND BROUGHT THE JURY BACK IN]
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT
THE COURT:

The record should indicate the jury is

back in the jury box.
You may ask your next question.
CROSS EXAMINATION CONTINUED
BY MR. BLACKHAM:
1

Q

Yes.

Mr. Squire, I u/as asking you about your statement

about taking urinalysis tests; do you recall that?

2

A

Yes, I do.

Q

What is a urinalysis test?

A

It's a test where I go in to a Parole—Probation

Officer and he gives me a test.
3

4

Q

Are you currently taking those tests?

A

Ura, I haven't for a few months•

Q

Okay,

You say it's when you go in to a Parole or

a Probation Officer and he asks you to take a test; correct?

5

A

Yes.

Q

Do you currently have a Parole or a Probation

